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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study we try to detect the relationship between financial and real sector employing in 
the estimation procedure the recent time-series techniques of co-integration, vector error-
correction modelling and Granger multivariate causality. We contribute to the existing 
literature by using for the first time a number of financial and economic variables for the case 
of Greece for the time period 1960-2005. Our empirical results reveal that the linkage 
between financial and real development is relatively weak in Greece and real sector plays the 
major role in the evolution of the financial system. The latter seems to promote growth only 
by increasing its competitiveness. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is generally accepted that in Greece, banks have played a significant role in the 
accumulation of savings and its allocation to productive activities, in contrast with the capital 
market, which was till recently limited, due to low supply of small family oriented Greek 
enterprises. 
 Until 1980 financial restrictions were imposed, so as the problem of inflation to be 
encountered, caused mainly by large fiscal expenses. These restrictions concerned the amount 
of credit directed to the private sector so as the needs for credit to the public sector to be 
covered. The main characteristic of this period was also high interest rates necessary to cope 
with inflation as well as fiscal deficits taking into consideration the liberalization of capital 
flows. 
 But after the entrance of Greece in the Monetary European Union and the adoption of 
Euro, there was a need for a monetary as well as a real convergence. Consequently it became 
compulsory for interest rates to fall and there was liberalization in the allocation of credit. 
This was followed by the entrance of new financial enterprises, gradual mergers and 
acquisitions, a reduction in the portion of public banks in the financial market and a 
consequent increase in the portion of private ones. It is remarkable that from 1998 to 2003, 
the asset of Greek banks nearly doubled and in 2000 it exceeded GDP. 
 Taking the above conditions into consideration we try to define the interactions between 
the Greek financial and real sector, by capturing macroeconomic policies associated with 
economic growth. Our paper contributes to the existing literature by using for the first time a 
number of financial and economic variables for the case of Greece and by employing in the 
estimation procedure the recent time-series techniques of co-integration, vector error-
correction modeling and Granger multivariate causality.   
 The structure of this study is the following. Section 2 presents a theoretical review 
regarding finance and growth. Section 3 describes the data used and the proxy measures of 
financial and real sector. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses the 
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methodology proposed. Finally, the conclusions and their associated policy implications are 
presented in the last section. 
 
2. THEORETICAL REVIEW 
During the last decades there has been a controversy of opinions, regarding the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. From one hand and 
according to Robinson (1952), Gupta (1984) and Demetriades and Hussein (1996), there is 
the «demand leading hypothesis» (Patrick 1996), which supports that growth induces 
financial development. Conversely, the «supply leading hypothesis», which is consistent with 
Gerschenkron’s view (1962), considers financial system to be the generating factor, trying to 
analyse the mechanisms through which finance affects growth (Levine, 1997). Bercivenga 
and Smith (1991) develop a model in which financial intermediaries influence growth rates, 
while de Rin and Hellmann (2002) introduce banks into a ‘big push model’, showing that they 
may act as catalysts for industrialization. King and Levine (1993) and Levine et al. (2000) 
among others give empirical supporting evidence, using cross country analysis. However, 
there are researchers, who support a two-way relationship between finance and growth 
(Thornton, 1996), little relationship (Atindehou et al.2005; Mouawiya Al-Awad and Narsi 
Harb 2005) or no relationship at all (Chang, 2002). 
Moreover, the supporters of the «supply leading hypothesis» have alternative views 
regarding the impact of financial liberalization on economic growth. According to the 
“structuralism view” proposed by Taylor (1983), Wijnbergen (1983) and Buffie (1984) 
financial deepening reduces the total real supply of credit available and hinders economic 
growth. On the contrary, McKinnon (1973, 1991), Shaw (1973) and Fry (1978) claim that 
liberalization of the financial system leads to the replacement of unproductive tangible assets 
with productive ones, positively influencing the quality and quantity of investment.  
In this study, we explore which of these theories apply in the case of Greece. 
Specifically, as shown next, there is an application of a two-way relationship between finance 
and growth (Thornton, 1996), indicating that although real sector acts as a determining factor 
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in the development of the financial market, finance is able to intrigue real sector, through 
increasing its liberalization and competitiveness.  
 
3. PROXY MEASURES OF FINANCIAL AND REAL SECTOR 
In an effort to analyze the interactions between real and financial sector in Greece, we use 
bivariate models between financial variables on one hand and real sector variables on the 
other, as well as an augmented VAR model, using annual data from 1960 to 2005. The 
financial variables which are indicative of the depth of the financial system are total credit of 
banking institutions to GDP (TOTCREGDP)-Levine et al. (2000), total deposits of banking 
institutions to GDP (TOTDEPGDP)- Thornton (1996) and liquid liabilities to asset banks 
(LIQTOASE)-Beck et al. (2000). 
The efficiency of the financial system is expressed by the ratio of total credit to the private 
sector to GDP (CPSGDP)-King and Levine (1993), total credit to the private sector to credit 
to the public sector (PRICREPUBCRE), short to long term loans which represents loans that 
have a year duration to loans of a longer duration (SHOLON), asset of monetary authorities to 
GDP (AMGDP), total credit of monetary authorities to total credit of banking institutions 
(MABAN)-King and Levine (1993) and spread which is the difference between lending and 
deposit rate (SPREAD)-Eschenbach et al.(2000). AMGDP and MABAN are used as 
measures of the degree of financial liberalisation and SPREAD of competitiveness (the lower 
the values, the more efficient the indicators).  
Real sector is characterised by a certain monetary policy, which is expressed by lending 
rate (LR) or deposit rate (DR) and a fiscal policy which is weighed by the ratio of public 
consumption to GDP (PUBCONGDP) and fiscal deficit to GDP (DEFGDP). Proxies of real 
sector growth are Gross Domestic Product (GDP), real gross capital formation (GFCF), total 
investments to GDP (INVGDP) and saving rate (S). S is defined as the ratio of net disposable 
income minus consumption to net disposable income. 
 SHOLON,  TOTDEPGDP, TOTCREGDP, MABAN and PRICREPUBCRE are derived 
from the “Long term statistical time series of the Greek economy” published by the 
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Department of Economic Studies of the Bank of Greece for the years 1960-1991 and since 
1991, from the “Monthly Statistical Bulletin” of the Bank of Greece (2004). LIQTOASE and 
CPSGDP are derived from the World Development Indicators Database. INVGDP is derived 
from the “Main national account aggregates of the Greek economy” published by the Ministry 
of National Economy. The rest of the data concerning macroeconomic and some financial 
figures comes from the database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All data is 
expressed in real prices as the ratio of nominal prices to the GDP deflator. GDP deflator is 
defined as the ratio of current prices to constant prices referenced to 2000 and is also taken 
from the IMF database.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the related variables. We observe that the mean 
and medium values are very close, implying stable time series of proxy measures, during 
sample periods covering from 1960 to 2005, while standard deviations are relatively high, due 
to the fact that we use proxies in levels. 
    Table 1 about here 
 Before we apply the Granger causality tests we have to test for stationarity of the time 
series into consideration. For this reason we employ Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) stationarity tests. To perform the ADF test we consider the following 
process of data generation  
∆Χt = α  +   δXt-1 +∑−
=
−∆
1
1
p
j
jtj Xδ + εt 
∆Χt = α  + βT  +  δXt-1 + ∑−
=
−∆
1
1
p
j
jtj Xδ +εt 
Where ∆ is the operator of the first-order difference; Xt is the variable under 
consideration; T is the linear time trend and t stands for time; p is the lag order; and εt is the 
white noise disturbance term with zero mean. The first of the process is with intercept, while 
the second is with trend and intercept. The null hypothesis is that Η0: δ=0 against Η1: δ≠0 and 
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the computed τ-values are compared with the MacKinnon’s tables of critical values 
(MacKinnon, 1996). If the computed τ-values are greater than the MacKinnon critical values 
then H0 is rejected and the variable is stationary. In the case that the τ-values are less than the 
critical values then the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is not rejected. Rejection of H0 
implies that the variable Xt is integrated of order zero [I(0)]. If the time series become 
stationary in first differences, then they are integrated of order one [I(1)]. Similarly and in 
order to perform the Phillips-Perron test we also rely on the previous regressions. This test 
controls for higher order serial correlation. 
The optimal number of lags is determined by using the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and the Schartz Criterion (SC). Autocorrelation is explored using the Breusch-Godfrey 
test. Tables 2-3 present the unit root tests. According to the test results, all variables are Ι(1), 
with the exception of PRICREPUBCRE, which is Ι(2) at all significant levels.  
Tables 2-3 about here 
To consider dynamic causality, direction and timing between financial and real 
sector, we estimate bivariate vector autoregressive models, based on AIC and SC criteria and 
we conduct cointegration tests, according to Maximum Eigenvalue and Τrace tests. 
Specifically, a VAR model can be presented as 
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Where Zt is a vector that contains the system variables; β1, β2, …, βp are parameters; α is the 
deterministic element of the VAR model; et is the vector of random errors distributed with 
zero mean and Ω variance matrix. Using the maximum likelihood method and the Johansen 
cointegration strategy we are able to estimate the cointegrating vectors between the 
nonstationary variables.  
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Table 4 presents the extracted results, which show that the only cointegration 
equations are traced between SPREAD-INVGDP, DEFGDP-SPREAD, DEFGDP-
TOTCREGDP and DEFGDP-AMGDP. 
Table 4 about here 
 In the above cases of cointegration we detect the existence of a short and long term 
relationship through Granger Causality tests and Vector Error Correction Model respectively.  
The short-run Granger causality is tested by the joint significance of the coefficients of the 
differenced explanatory variables by using the F-statistics while the long-run causality is 
implied through the significance of the t-test(s) of the lagged error correction term(s). 
However the VECM indicates econometric exogeneity of the variables if both the t and F 
tests are insignificant. 
 According to Granger Causality tests, SPREAD seems to cause INVGDP, while 
DEFGDP doesn’t seem to interact with SPREAD in the short run at a 5% significance level. 
On the other hand DEFGDP causes TOTDEPGDP and AMGDP causes DEFGDP at the same 
level of significance. With the exception of INVGDP-SPREAD, in all other cases there seems 
to be a long term relationship between all variables mentioned above, as all the adjustment 
coefficients towards long run equilibrium are statistically important. 
Tables 5-6 about here 
In analyzing the results, attention is given on the impulse response functions and forecast 
error variance decomposition. Impulse response functions show how one variable responds 
over time to a single innovation in itself or another variable. Innovations in the variables are 
represented by shocks in the error terms in the equations. Specifically, we observe that for 
instance, after a 1% point increase in spread, the response of INVGDP is negative, reaching a 
peak of –0.02%, after seven years, indicating that the more the banks become competitive, 
which is expressed by a low spread, the more INVGDP is promoted.  
After a 1% improvement of DEFGDP, SPREAD declines reaching a negative peak of –
0.68%, in five years and then is stabilized at about –0.55%. On the contrary, TOTCREGDP 
reacts positively to a 1% shock of DEFGDP, meaning that an improvement of DEFGDP 
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stimulates TOTCREGDP, which reaches a maximum of 0.03%, after 9 years. Finally 
DEFGDP is determined by AMGDP, negatively reacting to it, as a 1% increase in AMGDP, 
leads to a –0.017% decline of DEFGDP.  
At the same time, we compute forecast error variance decomposition, which seem to 
reinforce the results of the impulse response functions, by determining the relative importance 
of each variable in generating fluctuations in other variables. According to Figure 2, the 
results show that SPREAD explains more than 69.37% of INVGDP fluctuations, while 
INVGDP doesn’t seem to be important for SPREAD, after ten years ahead. Also, DEFGDP 
explains 42.08% of SPREAD, while SPREAD shocks explain 34.22% of DEFGDP.  
Moreover, DEFGDP explains 30.05% of TOTCREGDP, while the reverse relationship is 
relatively weak. Also, AMGDP explains 66.03% of DEFGDP fluctuations, while there is a 
lower significance (20.6%), in the opposite direction. 
Figures 1-2 about here 
Additionally, taking into consideration the break point of financial liberalisation in 
Greece, which was in the late 1980’s and in order to test the stability of our results over time, 
we implemented the same methodology, by dividing our sample into two sub periods 1960-
1987 and 1987-2005. The results indicated no cointegration relationships in the sub periods.  
 According to the above analysis, real sector variables tend to predict financial variables 
and vice versa, but cannot definitely be considered the cause of each other, as there can both 
respond to other changes of the economic environment. As there is a problem in the 
interpretation of VAR’s, due to “observational equivalence” (Cochrane, 1998), we use a 
multivariate model that also looks at the monetary sector of the economy, in an attempt to 
analyze the interactions between real, financial and monetary sector. The VAR model 
includes GDP and GFCF, as real sector indicators, DR as a monetary indicator and TOTDEP 
and AMGDP as indicators of financial depth and efficiency respectively.   
Table 7 about here 
  The Granger Causality tests show that GDP causes DR and TOTDEP, while TOTDEP 
causes DR at a 5% level of significance. According to the VEC model as well as the impulse 
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response and variance decomposition analysis, there seems to be a long term relationship, as 
shown in Figures 3-4. We also note that AMGDP explains a significant degree of GDP 
(21.7%) and GFCF fluctuations (26.18%), which to some extent verifies the results of the 
bivariate models that financial liberalization promotes growth. 
Figures 3-4 about here 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
From the results of our VAR analysis we see that the linkage between financial and real 
development is relatively weak in Greece as the only cointegration equations are between 
SPREAD-INVGDP, DEFGDP-SPREAD, DEFGDP-TOTCREGDP and DEFGDP-AMGDP. 
We also examine a multivariate VAR model, which includes monetary, financial and real 
variables among which we detect a cointegrating equation. 
We observe that there doesn’t seem to be a causal relationship leading from financial 
depth, but only from financial efficiency, as defined above, to the development of the real 
sector, through the impact of SPREAD on INVGDP and AMGDP on DEFGDP. It seems that 
the degree of financial liberalization expressed by the proxies SPREAD and AMGDP has a 
positive influence on the ratio of investments to GDP and public deficit, respectively. 
 On the other hand, the results indicate that real sector defines the role of finance, 
according to the “demand leading hypothesis” (Robinson, 1952; Gupta, 1984; Demetriades 
and Hussein, 1996). Specifically, through causality tests, impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition analysis, we observe that DEFGDP is crucial for the evolution of 
TOTCREGDP and GDP for TOTDEP, which is in agreement with the restricted and 
government directed role of financial institutions. 
An aggravation of public deficit creates a need for public lending, increasing deposit rates 
and consequently the ratio of liquid liabilities to asset banks. On the contrary, it leads to a 
decrease in TOTCREGDP, as lending rates are kept at very high levels, in an attempt to face 
inflation.  
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   Taking into consideration the results of this econometric analysis, we conclude that the 
restrictions of the Greek financial system mitigated its role to the development of economy, 
although there is a sign of a two-way relationship between finance and growth (Thornton, 
1996), through efficiency measures of the financial system. 
 Spread, which is used as a proxy of the competitiveness of the banking system, was 
proved to be a stimulating factor. Consequently, it is important that Greek banks try to 
approach the spread of the average European banks, by improving the quality of their 
services, diversifying products and expanding their activities. 
A promising path of research would be to use quarterly after 1987 data, in order to find 
out whether the liberalization of the financial system in Greece, which gradually took place 
after the late 80’s, reinforced its role and made it capable of supporting a sustainable 
economic development.  
For future extensions of our work, it would also be interesting to examine the 
relationships between financial and real sector, in economies which experienced similar 
macroeconomic characteristics, such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, with the hope of finding 
similarities that would contribute to the implementation of relative effective policies. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean SD Median Max Min 
Financial sector 
     
Financial depth 
     
TOTDEPGDP 0,61 0,23 0,72 0,97 0,18 
TOTCREGDP 0,46 0,11 0,47 0,63 0,75 
LIQTOASE 13,30 4,28 17,00 18,00 3,00 
      
Financial efficiency      
CPSGDP 0,44 0,13 0,43 0,85 0,26 
MABAN 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,08 0,00 
PRICREPUBCRE 5,97 2,09 5,90 11,67 2,09 
SHOLON 1,47 0,35 1,34 2,34 0,99 
SPREAD 4,99 2,22 4,91 9,23 2,00 
AMGDP 0,29 0,10 0,28 0,55 0,11 
      
 Real secror      
GDP 276,48 112,7 255,28 526,49 96,51 
GFCF 61,13 27,43 57,17 127,85 18,34 
INVGDP 0,22 0,02 0,22 0,25 0,19 
S 0,26 0,05 0,27 0,38 0,12 
 
     
Monetary policy      
LR 15,49 7,23 12,89 29,45 6,79 
DR 10,14 5,57 9,25 20,67 2,23 
 
     
Fiscal policy      
DEFGDP -0,06 0,05 -0,04 -0,01 -0,21 
PUBCONGDP  0,15 0,02 0,15 0,20  0,11 
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Table 2: Unit root ADF test-Annual data 1960-2005  
Levels First difference 
Variables Deterministic   Probability   Probability 
TOTDEP intercept 1,2976 0,9983 -4,9741 0,0002 
 trend and intercept -1,7493 0,7123 -5,1697 0,0006 
TOTDEPGDP intercept -1,5212 0,5139 -6,4029 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -1,3843 0,8522 -6,4800 0,0000 
TOTCREGDP intercept -2,0935 0,2483 -4,0241 0,0033 
  trend and intercept -2,3205 0,4133 -3,9417 0,0192 
LIQTOASE intercept -0,8523 0,7936 -6,2547 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -2,7036 0,2403 -6,2239 0,0000 
CPSGDP  intercept 0,0061 0,9540 -3,3730 0,0174 
  trend and intercept -4,0875 0,0136 -3,5333 0,0481 
MABAN intercept -1,8472 0,3532 -8,6176 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -2,0012 0,5833 -8,9790 0,0000 
PRICREPUBCRE intercept -0,8985 0,7784 -2,2241 0,2012* 
  trend and intercept  0,4971 0,9989 -3,2427 0,0909* 
SHOLON intercept -2,0196 0,2776 -4,6988 0,0005 
  trend and intercept -1,7332 0,7176 -4,6917 0,0028 
SPREAD intercept -1,3586 0,5935 -5,4115 0,0001 
  trend and intercept -1,0609 0,9239 -5,4517 0,0003 
AMGDP intercept -1,6647 0,4419 -7,4285 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -1,3236 0,8691 -7,6267 0,0000 
GDP intercept 1,5026 0,9991 -5,8575 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -0,3336 0,9872 -6,1484 0,0000 
GFCF intercept 0,2354 0,9720 -5,0091 0,0002 
  trend and intercept -2,1940 0,4810 -4,9952 0,0011 
INVGDP intercept -2,6580 0,0895 -6,8655 0,0000 
  trend and intercept  3,3086 0,0782 -6,8425 0,0000 
S intercept -2,3629 0,1585 -5,8498 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -1,6948 0,7346 -7,1389 0,0000 
DR intercept -1,0464 0,7282 -4,2788 0,0015 
  trend and intercept   0,3673 0,9984 -4,7189 0,0023 
LR intercept -1,4916 0,5280 -3,2272 0,0253 
  trend and intercept -0,6431 0,9708 -3,5732 0,0445 
DEFGDP intercept -1,9898 0,2899 -7,2016 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -2,6424 0,2649 -7,1810 0,0000 
PUBCONGDP intercept -1,8289 0,3622 -9,5162 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -1,9555 0,6091 -8,4797 0,0000 
*unit root at a 5% level of significance 
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Table 3: Unit root -Phillips-Perron test-Annual data 1960-2005 
Levels First difference 
Variables Deterministic   Probability   Probability 
TOTDEP intercept 1,2539 0,9980 -4,9814 0,0002 
 trend and intercept -2,1308 0,5152 -5,1750 0,0006 
TOTDEPGDP intercept -1,5212 0,5139 -6,4029 0,0000 
 trend and intercept -1,3843 0,8522 -6,4800 0,0000 
TOTCREGDP  intercept -2,0935 0,2483 -4,0242 0,0033 
  trend and intercept -2,3205 0,4133 -3,9418 0,0192 
LIQTOASE intercept -1,5043 0,5224 -10,0470 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -3,1491 0,1078 -9,9565 0,0000 
CPSGDP  intercept  0,0061 0,9540 -3,3730 0,0174 
  trend and intercept -4,0875 0,0136 -3,5333 0,0481 
MABAN  intercept -3,4358 0,0152 -8,8632 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -1,6793 0,7424 -23,5585 0,0000 
PRICREPUBCRE intercept -1,3166 0,6128 -2,0325 0,2723* 
  trend and intercept  0,8377 0,9997 -3,1493 0,1093* 
SHOLON intercept -2,6026 0,1006 -4,8006 0,0004 
  trend and intercept -1,9913 0,5886 -4,7305 0,0025 
SPREAD intercept -1,4549 0,5465 -5,4187 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -1,3444 0,8629 -5,4517 0,0003 
AMGDP intercept -1,6155 0,4665 -7,5242 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -1,3236 0,8691 -7,9842 0,0000 
      
GDP intercept  1,4745 0,9990 -5,8445 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -0,3990 0,9847 -6,1501 0,0000 
GFCF intercept  0,0436 0,9575 -4,9388 0,0002 
  trend and intercept -1,5865 0,7827 -4,8709 0,0015 
INVGDP  intercept -2,7048 0,0813 -6,8655 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -3,3086 0,0782 -6,8462 0,0000 
S intercept -2,3923 0,1504 -5,8503 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -1,6173 0,7677 -7,5714 0,0000 
DR intercept -1,0565 0,7247 -4,2788 0,0015 
  trend and intercept -0,0373 0,9945 -4,7484 0,0021 
LR intercept -1,2362 0,6500 -3,2272 0,0253 
  trend and intercept  0,2322 0,9976 -3,5886 0,0430 
DEFGDP intercept -1,7768 0,3861 -10,4491 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -2,8035 0,2047 -11,1500 0,0000 
PUBCONGDP intercept  0,8865 0,9944 -9,3038 0,0000 
  trend and intercept -1,6342 0,7633 -9,4964 0,0000 
* unit root at a 5% level of significance  
 
 16
Table  4: Cointegrating vectors  /Mag eigenvalue test  and Trace test:        
                 Bivariare  models 
    Trace test
                      Max eigen  
 invgdp spread (VAR lag=1)   
Ho: r=0* 16,7178 14,8014 
Ho: r≤1 1,9164 1,9164 
  
defgdp  spread (VAR lag=1)   
Ho: r=0* 17,5484 15,7774 
Ho: r≤1 1,7635 1,7635 
  
defgdp amgdp (VAR lag=1)  
Ho: r=0* 16,9516 14,4538 
Ho: r≤1 2,4978 2,4978 
  
 
Critical value 0,05 
(allow for linear deterministic trend in 
data)   
Ho: r=0 15,4947 14,2646 
Ho: r≤1 3,8415 3,8425 
  
   
defgdp totcregdp (VAR lag=1)                        
Ho: r=0*                                                 11.4889 11.4838 
Ho: r≤1 0.0049 0.0049 
   
Critical value 0,05 
   
Ho: r=0 12,3209 11,2248 
Ho: r≤1 4,1299 4,1299 
  
   
r = number of cointegrating vectors 
Lags are defined according to AIC and SC  
 *Rejection of Ho (Ho:There is no cointegration relation) 
  
Note: The rest of the cointegrating equations, which proved to be insignificant are available upon request. 
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Table 5: Vector Error Correction models  
Explanatory Variables d(invgdp) d(spread) 
Short run: F-statistic   
D(invgdp(-1)) -0,0271 1,7730 
D(spread(-1)) -0,0011 0,2039 
Ac-t statistic 0,0017 0,0220 
 
ECT-t statistic   -0,3786* -3,3636 
 
 d(defgdp) d(spread) 
Short run: F-statistic 
D(defgdp(-1)) -0,0082 14,8074* 
D(spread(-1)) 0,0021           0,3116* 
Ac-t statistic -0,0012 0,0675 
 
ECT-t statistic -0,3464* -13,3266* 
 
 d(defgdp) d(totcregdp) 
Short run: F-statistic 
D(defgdp(-1)) -0,0678 -0,0468 
D(totcregdp(-1)) 0,2263 0,0131 
Ac-t statistic -0,0017           0,0040 
 
ECT-t statistic -0,2366*           0,2986* 
 
 d(defgdp)         d(amgdp) 
Short run: F-statistic 
d(defgdp(-1)) -0,1627          0,8492* 
d(amgdp(-1)) -0,6372          0,1669 
Ac-t statistic -0,0009          0,0033 
ECT-t statistic   -1,9862*         -2,1098* 
 
*Statistically significant at a 5% level  
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Table 6: Granger Causality tests of bivariate models 
Granger Causality tests F statistic Probability 
 Spread  doesn’t Granger cause Defgdp 3,6641 0,0636 
 Defgdp  doesn’t Granger cause Spread 1,1815 0,2810 
 Defgdp doesn’t Granger cause Totcregdp 7,1278 0,0113 
 Totcregdp doesn’t Granger cause Defgdp 1,8225 0,1854 
 Spread  doesn’t Granger cause Invgdp 11,9348 0,0013 
 Invgdp  doesn’t Granger cause  Spread 0,0067 0,9352 
 Defgdp  doesn’t  Granger cause  Amgdp 0,9949 0,3252 
 Amgdp  doesn’t Granger cause  Defgdp 9,0872 0,0047  
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Table 7: Results of the augmented VAR model     
      
1)Cointegrating vectors  /Mag eigenvalue test  and Trace test   
gdp gfcf dr amgdp totdep (var lag=1)    
    Trace test      Max eig test   
Ho: r=0 84,9796 42,6776    
Ho: r≤1 42,3020 19,429    
Ho: r≤2 22,8729 12,0771    
Ho: r≤3 10,7958 8,3277    
Ho: r≤4 2,4681 2,4681    
      
Critical values 0,05      
Ho: r=0 69,8188 33,8769    
Ho: r≤1 47,8561 27,5843    
Ho: r≤2 29,7971 21,1316    
Ho: r≤3 15,4947 14,2646    
Ho: r≤4 3,8414 3,84146    
R = number of cointegrating vectors      
Lags are defined according to AIC and SC      
*Rejection of Ho (Ho:There is no cointegration relation)     
      
2) VEC model      
Short run: F-statistic        d(gfcf)              d(gdp)     d(amgdp)       d(dr)     d(totdep)
D(gfcf(-1)) 0,6594*             1,0577*    -0,0044 0,0416 -0,2765
D(gdp(-1))     -0,1247           -0,1794    0,0009 -0,0152 0,1334
D(amgdp(-1))      43,7843*          105,7071*   -0,2405 5,5314 -41,6785
D(dr(-1))       1,7169* 2,9989*   -0,0120 -0,0437 4,4327
D(totdep(-1))     0,0544            0,0049   0,0002 0,0209        0,0078
    1,6770 8,9917*   -0,0037 -0,1918      9,4375*
  
ECT-t statistic    -0,7762*           -1,3892*   0,0057*  0,1327* -1,3344*
 
*Statistically important at a 5% level      
 
 
Specification tests: 
LM. Stat: 21,86          Prob. 0,64  (lag 2) 
Chi.-sq: 204               Prob. 0,10 
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of biVARiate models 
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Figure 2: VARiance decomposition of biVARiate VAR models 
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Figure 3 Impulse responses of the augmented VAR model 
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Figure 4: VARiance decomposition of the augmented VAR model 
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